In an effort to provide a better understanding for what testamentary capacity expert psychologists look for when forming opinions about whether the person had testamentary capacity in the execution of a will, trust, beneficiary designation, or other testamentary contractual document, I am highlighting the statutes, case law, and jury instructions specific to all 50 states. Each will be in its own blog post. Seventeenth up, Kentucky.

Bye v. Mattingly (1998)

In Kentucky there is a strong presumption in favor of a testator possessing adequate testamentary capacity. This presumption can only be rebutted by the strongest showing of incapacity (citing Williams v. Vollman, Ky.App., 738 S.W.2d 849 (1987);  Taylor v. Kennedy, Ky .App., 700 S.W.2d 415, 416 (1985)).

The burden is placed upon those who seek to overturn the will to demonstrate the lack of capacity (citing Warnick, 282 S.W.2d at 609;  Pfuelb, 275 Ky. at 588, 122 S.W.2d at 128).

Testamentary capacity is only relevant at the time of execution of a will (citing New v. Creamer, Ky., 275 S.W.2d 918 (1955)).

To validly execute a will, a testator must:  (1) know the natural objects of her bounty;  (2) know her obligations to them;  (3) know the character and value of her estate;  and (4) dispose of her estate according to her own fixed purpose (citing Adams v. Calia, Ky., 433 S.W.2d 661 (1968);  Waggener v. General Ass'n of Baptists, Ky., 306 S.W.2d 271 (1957);  Burke v. Burke, Ky.App., 801 S.W.2d 691 (1990);  Fischer v. Heckerman, Ky.App., 772 S.W.2d 642 (1989)).

Merely being an older person, possessing a failing memory, momentary forgetfulness, weakness of mental powers or lack of strict coherence in conversation does not render one incapable of validly executing a will (citing Ward v. Norton, Ky., 385 S.W.2d 193 (1964)).

“Every man possessing the requisite mental powers may dispose of his property by will in any way he may desire, and a jury will not be permitted to overthrow it, and to make a will for him to accord with their ideas of justice and propriety,” (citing Burke v. Burke, Ky.App., 801 S.W.2d 691, 693 (1991) (citing Cecil's Ex'rs. v. Anhier, 176 Ky. 198, 195 S.W. 837, 846 (1917))).

When a testator is suffering from a mental illness which ebbs and flows in terms of its effect on the testator's mental competence, it is presumed that the testator was mentally fit when the will was executed. This is commonly referred to as the lucid interval doctrine.  (citing Warnick v. Childers, Ky., 282 S.W.2d 608, 609 (1955);  Pfuelb v. Pfuelb, 275 Ky. 588, 122 S.W.2d 128 (1938).   See In re Weir's Will, 39 Ky. 434 (1840);  Watts v. Bullock, 11 Ky. 252 (1822)).

Burris v. Burris, 210 Ky. 731, 276 S.W. 820

An insane delusion is the spontaneous production of one’s own mind, entirely causeless, or a belief in things which no rational mind would believe to exist.

Moates v. Rone, 242 Ky. 287, 46 S.W.2d 100

An insane delusion is an idea or belief which springs spontaneously from a diseased or perverted mind without reason, or without foundation in fact; it is distinguishable from a belief which is founded upon prejudice or aversion, no matter how unreasonable or unfounded the prejudice or aversion may be. If it is the product of a reasoning mind, no matter how slight the evidence on which it is based, it cannot be classed as an insane delusion (citing Coffey v. Miller, 160 Ky. 415, 169 S.W. 852, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 30).

It is not enough that others might conclude that the testator's belief was unjustified, if the testator was in possession of facts affording a basis for his conclusion (citing Trustees of Epworth Memorial Methodist Church v. Overman, 185 Ky. 773, 215 S.W. 942).

Perkins’ Guardian v. Bell, 172 S.W.2d 617 (Ky. Ct. App. 1943), 172 S.W.2d 617

Prejudice is not typically an insane delusion, unless it fits all the criteria of an insane delusion.