50 State Testamentary Capacity Project: Delaware Testamentary Capacity Expert Definitions

In an effort to provide a better understanding for what testamentary capacity expert psychologists look for when forming opinions about whether the person had testamentary capacity in the execution of a will, trust, beneficiary designation, or other testamentary contractual document, I am highlighting the statutes, case law, and jury instructions specific to all 50 states. Each will be in its own blog post. Eighth up, Delaware.

Davis v. Estate of Perry, Civil Action No. 2419-VCG (Del. Ch. Jan. 2, 2013)

The testator must be able to exercise judgment. She must understand that she is committing a testamentary act, as well as comprehend the natural objects of her bounty and, generally, the extent of the property she owns (citing In re Estate of West, 522 A.2d 1256, 1263 (Del. 1987)).

Mere confusion is not enough to render a person incapacitated.

In re: the Last Will and Testament of Blanche M. Hurley, deceased, et al.   C.A. No. 8473-ML

Only a modest degree of competence is required for an individual to possess testamentary capacity (citing In re Estate of West, 522 A.2d 1256, 1263 (Del. 1987)).

A person who makes a will must, at the time the document is ecxecuted, be capable of exercising thought, reflection, and judgment, and must know what she is doing and how she is disposing of her property (citing In re Estate of West, 522 A.2d 1256, 1263 (Del. 1987)).

The testator must have sufficient memory and understanding to comprehend the nature and character of her act (citing In re Langmeier, 466 A.2d 386, 402 (Del. Ch. 1983)).

The Court cannot infer a lack of capacity solely based on a testator’s age, and advanced age coupled with a tumor and non-specific medical problems does not rise to the level of supporting a reasonable inference of incapacity.

Tracy v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 101 A.2d 321 (1953)

Partial insanity, meaning an insane delusion, will avail to defeat a will which is the direct offspring of such partial insanity or insane delusion (citing Duffield v. Morris' Ex'r, 2 Har. 375, 379).

A common type of insane delusion is the testator's belief, not based on any evidence, that his wife is unfaithful to him, and that her children are not his own, as a result of which he executes a will disinheriting them. If, however, such a belief is based upon evidence, even though slight and insufficient, the belief, although erroneous, is not an insane delusion. * * "The practical difficulty in applying this rule is that the testator is dead, and that it is impossible to know on what evidence he based his belief. As a result, an insane delusion may be found to exist although testator might have been able to show the existence of evidence on which he based his belief. * * * "The fact that testator dislikes certain of the natural objects of his bounty does not establish an insane delusion; even if such dislike is groundless; and still less if such dislike is based upon some reason, although it may be an unjust one.

In re: Estate of James V. Tigani, C.A. No. 7339-ML (2016)

An insane delusion is a false belief for which there is no reasonable foundation, a conception of the existence of something which does not exist, or which the mind of the person entertaining it cannot permanently be disabused (citing In re Barnes’ Will, 18 A.2d at 434).

Is the belief of the testator a mere false idea as distinguished from an insane delusion? Assuming such a delusion, did the testator change beneficiaries of the estate because of that belief?