50 State Testamentary Capacity Project: Arizona Testamentary Capacity Expert Definitions
In an effort to provide a better understanding for what testamentary capacity expert psychologists look for when forming opinions about whether the person had testamentary capacity in the execution of a will, trust, beneficiary designation, or other testamentary contractual document, I am highlighting the statutes, case law, and jury instructions specific to all 50 states. Each will be in its own blog post. Third up, Arizona.
In re Walter’s Estate, 77 Ariz. 122, 267 P.2d 896 (1954)
The testator must have had the ability to understand the natural objects of their bounty, the kind and character of their property, and the nature of the testamentary act.
In re Thomas’ Estate, 105 Ariz. 186, 189, 461 P.2d 484, 487 (1969)
Adjudication of incapacity under the guardianship statute does not necessarily mean the person lacks testamentary capacity.
To be found to have testamentary capacity, the person must (1) know and understand the nature of the act, (2) know and understand the nature and extent of their property, and (3) know the objects of their bounty.
In re Weil’s Estate, 21 Ariz. App. 278, 518 P.2d 995 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974)
The relevant test for knowing the objects of one’s bounty is to (1) know the objects of one’s bounty, and (2) appreciate their relationship to the testator.
It is obvious that the injury concerning this element of testamentary capacity must be focused on whether the testator has the Capacity to know who these objects of his bounty are and to appreciate his relationship to them (i.e., they are my sons) and not whether in fact the testator appreciates his moral obligations and duties toward such heirs in accordance with some standard fixed by society, the courts or psychiatrists.
Evans v. Liston, 116 Ariz. 218, 568 P.2d 1116 (App. 1977)
Cognitive or emotional problems that invalidate a will must be so broad as to produce general mental incompetence or insanity, which causes hallucinations or delusions.
In re: Estate of Killen, 188 Ariz. 562, 937 P.2d 1368 (Ariz. 1996)
General deteriorating mental condition, eccentricities, idiosyncrasies, or mental slowness and poor memory associated with old age do not necessarily destroy testamentary capacity.
If a mental illness produces insane delusions that affected the provisions of a person’s will (or any other prongs required for testamentary capacity) and the disposition of that person’s property, a will may be nullified on the grounds that the person was not of sound mind due to an insane delusion.
Citing In re Will of Maynard, 64 N.C. App. 211, 307 S.E.2.d 416, 430 (1983):
If a person has sufficient mental ability to make a will but is subject to an insane delusion, i.e., monomania, as to one of the essential requirements of testamentary capacity, the will would not be valid. For example, if the testator has an insane delusion as to the objects of his bounty, it would invalidate his will.
An insane delusion must be distinguished from prejudice, hate, bad judgment, ill will, and any number of other conditions which might be associated with sanity. To be sufficient to invalidate the will, the delusion must have no foundation in fact and must be the product of the testator's diseased or deranged mind.
In re Teel’s Estate, 14 Ariz.App. 371, 483 P.2d 603 (1971)
A showing of intellectual disability, without more, is not sufficient to prove testamentary incapacity.
Even if a person is incompetent and has a guardian, that does not necessarily mean they have testamentary incapacity.