50 State Testamentary Capacity Project: Arkansas Testamentary Capacity Expert Definitions

In an effort to provide a better understanding for what testamentary capacity expert psychologists look for when forming opinions about whether the person had testamentary capacity in the execution of a will, trust, beneficiary designation, or other testamentary contractual document, I am highlighting the statutes, case law, and jury instructions specific to all 50 states. Each will be in its own blog post. Fourth up, Arkansas.

Probate Benchbook 2022

Citing Green v. Holland, 9 Ark. App. 233, 657 S.W.2d 572 (1983):

The test for “testamentary capacity” is whether the testatrix at the time the will was executed had a fair comprehension of the nature and extent of her property and to whom she was giving it.

Citing Noland v. Noland, 330 Ark. 660, 956 S.W.2d 173 (1997):

Complete sanity in medical sense is not required if power to think rationally existed at time will was made.

Goza v. Estate of Potts

Citing Taylor v. McClintock, 87 Ark. 243, 112 S.W. 405 (1908):

Testamentary capacity is the ability of the testator to retain in memory, without prompting, the extent and condition of the property to be disposed of, to comprehend to whom he is giving, and to realize the deserts and relations to him of those whom he excludes from the will. 

It is sufficient if he has the mental capacity to understand the effect of his will as executed.

Where one conceives something extravagant, and believes it as a fact, when in reality it has no existence, but is purely a product of the imagination, and where such belief is so persistent and permanent that the one who entertains it cannot be convinced by any evidence or argument to the contrary, such a person is possessed by an insane delusion.

Citing Hiler v. Cude, 248 Ark. 1065, 455 S.W.2d 891 (1970):

The same degree of mental capacity is necessary to revoke a will as to make one.

If one has the capacity to make a will, he may make it as unjust as revenge can dictate. 

Citing Sullivant v. Sullivant, 236 Ark. 95, 364 S.W.2d 665 (1963):

With respect to the ability to know the extent and condition of the property to be disposed of and to whom it is being given, and to appreciate the deserts and relations to the testator of others against whom he discriminates or excludes from participation in his estate, that he actually has this knowledge is unnecessary.

Thus, the testator does not need to know the actual names of each and every one of his distant relatives who might inherit from his intestate estate; he only was required to have the capacity to know them.

Citing Kirkpatrick v. Union Bank of Benton, 269 Ark. 970, 601 S.W.2d 607 (Ark. App. 1980):

While an individual may possess the requisite testamentary capacity, he may, at the same time, be laboring under one or more insane delusions that may have the effect of making his purported will a nullity.

Citing Huffman v. Dawkins, 273 Ark. 520, 526, 622 S.W.2d 159, 162 (1981):

An insane delusion must not only exist but the will must be a product of the delusion; if there is any basis in fact for the delusion, or if it is not proven that the will was a product of the delusion, such a delusion will not warrant setting aside a legal document.

Citing Accord Schweitzer v. Bean, 154 Ark. 228, 242 S.W. 63 (1922):

The test for an insane delusion is whether there was any basis for the decedent’s beliefs.