50 State Testamentary Capacity Project: Maine Testamentary Capacity Expert Definitions

In an effort to provide a better understanding for what testamentary capacity expert psychologists look for when forming opinions about whether the person had testamentary capacity in the execution of a will, trust, beneficiary designation, or other testamentary contractual document, I am highlighting the statutes, case law, and jury instructions specific to all 50 states. Each will be in its own blog post. Nineteenth up, Maine.

In re: Leonard, Me., 321 A.2d 486, 488 (1974)

A `disposing mind' involves the exercise of so much mind and memory as would enable a person to transact common and simple kinds of business with that intelligence which belongs to the weakest class of sound minds; and a disposing memory exists when one can recall the general nature, condition and extent of his property, and his relations to those to whom he gives, and also to those from whom he excludes, his bounty. He must have active memory enough to bring to his mind the nature and particulars of the business to be transacted, and mental power enough to appreciate them, and act with sense and judgment in regard to them. He must have sufficient capacity to comprehend the condition of his property, his relations to the persons who were or should have been the objects of his bounty, and the scope and bearing of the provisions of his will. He must have sufficient active memory to collect in his mind, without prompting, the particulars or elements of the business to be transacted, and to hold them in his mind a sufficient length of time to perceive at least their obvious relations to each other, and be able to form some rational judgment in relation to them, (citing Hall v. Perry, 87 Me. 569, 572, 33 A. 160, 161 (1895); Waning, Appellant, 151 Me. 239, 117 A.2d 347 (1955); MacVeagh, Appellant, 141 Me. 260, 42 A.2d 903 (1945); Martin, Appellant, 133 Me. 422, 179 A. 655 (1935); In Re Will of Loomis, 133 Me. 81, 174 A. 38 (1934)).

Evidence of a testator’s conduct, emotions, methods of thought, and the like, for a very considerable period before and after the execution of the will, is admissible to show his capacity at the moment of making the will. The evidence must be restricted to a reasonable time on either side of the execution of the will, (citing Waning, Appellant, 151 Me. at 252, 117 A.2d at 354).

Estate of Turf 435 A.2d 1087 (1981)

The proponent of a will must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the testator’s capacity to execute the will (citing In re: Leonard, Me., 321 A.2d 486, 488 (1974)).