50 State Testamentary Capacity Project: Maryland Testamentary Capacity Expert Definitions

In an effort to provide a better understanding for what testamentary capacity expert psychologists look for when forming opinions about whether the person had testamentary capacity in the execution of a will, trust, beneficiary designation, or other testamentary contractual document, I am highlighting the statutes, case law, and jury instructions specific to all 50 states. Each will be in its own blog post. Twentieth up, Maryland.

Phelps v. Goldberg 270 Md. 694 (Md. 1974), 313 A.2d 683

By the legal standard he who is possessed of sufficient capacity at the time of executing his will to make a disposition of his estate with judgment  and understanding in reference to the amount and situation of his property and the relative claims of the different persons who should have been the objects of his bounty, is mentally competent to make a valid will, (citing Berry v. Safe Deposit Co., 96 Md., 45, 53 A. 720 (1902)).

In this jurisdiction, as in most others, sound and disposing mind simply means that the decedent must have had, at the time of execution of the instrument, sufficient mental capacity to dispose of his property or estate with judgment and understanding, considering the nature and character of the estate as well as the relative claims of different persons, who would be the natural objects of [his] bounty, (citing Thomas v. Young, 57 App. D.C. 282, 284, 22 F.2d 588, 590 (1927)).

As stated by Sykes, (Contest of Wills in Maryland § 61 at p. 72 (1941)), Whether a testator had sufficient mental capacity is determined by a consideration of his external acts and appearances. It must appear that at the time of making the will he had a full understanding of the nature of the business in which he was engaged; a recollection of the property of which he intended to dispose and the persons to whom he meant to give it, and the relative claims of the different persons who were or should have been the objects of his bounty, (citing Sellers v. Qualls, 206 Md. 58, 110 A.2d 73 (1954)).

The law presumes that every man is sane and has capacity to make a valid will, and the burden of proving the contrary rests upon those who allege that he lacked mental capacity, (citing Cronin v. Kimble, 156 Md. 489, 494, 144 A. 698, 700 (1929); Smith v. Shuppner, 125 Md. 409, 417, 93 A. 514, 517 (1915)). Moreover, in the absence of proof of prior permanent insanity, it must be shown that the testator was of unsound mind at the time the will was executed in order to overcome the presumption of sanity, (citing Acker v. Acker, 172 Md. 477, 192 A. 327 (1937); Gesell v. Baugher, 100 Md. 677, 60 A. 481 (1905)).

Benjamin v. Woodring, 268 Md. 593, 601, 303 A.2d 779 (1973)

A testator's “insane delusion,” also called “monomania,” is in the law a type of unsoundness of mind that will invalidate his will, for lack of capacity, if the delusion produced the disposition made in the will. The testator's delusion must have been insane and his will must have been a consequence of the insane delusion.

Johnson v. Johnson, 105 Md. 81, 85, 65 A. 918 (1907)

an “insane delusion” is a belief in things impossible, or a belief in things possible, but so improbable under the surrounding circumstances, that no man of sound mind could give them credence.

Doyle v. Rody, 180 Md. 471, 479, 25 A.2d 457 (1942)

An insane delusion is a false belief for which there is no reasonable foundation ․ concerning which [the testator's] mind is not open to permanent correction through argument or evidence.

Dougherty IV v. Rubenstein III. 914 A.2d 184, 172 MD. App. 269 (2007)

Eccentricity, peculiar beliefs (such as in spiritualism or healing powers), and hostility or aversion to one relative or another are not, standing alone, insane delusions (citing Brown v. Ward, 53 Md. 376 (1880)).